Practice Management

The Food and Drug Administration has approved denileukin diftitox-cxdl (Lymphir, Citius Pharmaceuticals) for adults with relapsed or refractory stage 1-3 cutaneous T-cell lymphoma after at least one prior systemic therapy.

The immunotherapy is a reformulation of denileukin diftitox (Ontak), initially approved in 1999 for certain patients with persistent or recurrent cutaneous T-cell lymphoma. In 2014, the original formulation was voluntarily withdrawn from the US market. Citius acquired rights to market a reformulated product outside of Asia in 2021. 

This is the first indication for Lymphir, which targets interleukin-2 receptors on malignant T cells.

This approval marks “a significant milestone” for patients with cutaneous T-cell lymphoma, a rare cancer, company CEO Leonard Mazur said in a press release announcing the approval. “The introduction of Lymphir, with its potential to rapidly reduce skin disease and control symptomatic itching without cumulative toxicity, is expected to expand the [cutaneous T-cell lymphoma] treatment landscape and grow the overall market, currently estimated to be $300-$400 million.” 

Approval was based on the single-arm, open-label 302 study in 69 patients who had a median of four prior anticancer therapies. Patients received 9 mcg/kg daily from day 1 to day 5 of 21-day cycles until disease progression or unacceptable toxicity.

The objective response rate was 36.2%, including complete responses in 8.7% of patients. Responses lasted 6 months or longer in 52% of patients. Over 80% of subjects had a decrease in skin tumor burden, and almost a third had clinically significant improvements in pruritus. 

Adverse events occurring in 20% or more of patients include increased transaminases, decreased albumin, decreased hemoglobin, nausea, edema, fatigue, musculoskeletal pain, rash, chills, constipation, pyrexia, and capillary leak syndrome.

Labeling carries a boxed warning of capillary leak syndrome. Other warnings include visual impairment, infusion reactions, hepatotoxicity, and embryo-fetal toxicity. Citius is under a postmarketing requirement to characterize the risk for visual impairment.

The company expects to launch the agent within 5 months.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

The Food and Drug Administration has approved denileukin diftitox-cxdl (Lymphir, Citius Pharmaceuticals) for adults with relapsed or refractory stage 1-3 cutaneous T-cell lymphoma after at least one prior systemic therapy.

The immunotherapy is a reformulation of denileukin diftitox (Ontak), initially approved in 1999 for certain patients with persistent or recurrent cutaneous T-cell lymphoma. In 2014, the original formulation was voluntarily withdrawn from the US market. Citius acquired rights to market a reformulated product outside of Asia in 2021. 

This is the first indication for Lymphir, which targets interleukin-2 receptors on malignant T cells.

This approval marks “a significant milestone” for patients with cutaneous T-cell lymphoma, a rare cancer, company CEO Leonard Mazur said in a press release announcing the approval. “The introduction of Lymphir, with its potential to rapidly reduce skin disease and control symptomatic itching without cumulative toxicity, is expected to expand the [cutaneous T-cell lymphoma] treatment landscape and grow the overall market, currently estimated to be $300-$400 million.” 

Approval was based on the single-arm, open-label 302 study in 69 patients who had a median of four prior anticancer therapies. Patients received 9 mcg/kg daily from day 1 to day 5 of 21-day cycles until disease progression or unacceptable toxicity.

The objective response rate was 36.2%, including complete responses in 8.7% of patients. Responses lasted 6 months or longer in 52% of patients. Over 80% of subjects had a decrease in skin tumor burden, and almost a third had clinically significant improvements in pruritus. 

Adverse events occurring in 20% or more of patients include increased transaminases, decreased albumin, decreased hemoglobin, nausea, edema, fatigue, musculoskeletal pain, rash, chills, constipation, pyrexia, and capillary leak syndrome.

Labeling carries a boxed warning of capillary leak syndrome. Other warnings include visual impairment, infusion reactions, hepatotoxicity, and embryo-fetal toxicity. Citius is under a postmarketing requirement to characterize the risk for visual impairment.

The company expects to launch the agent within 5 months.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

The Food and Drug Administration has approved denileukin diftitox-cxdl (Lymphir, Citius Pharmaceuticals) for adults with relapsed or refractory stage 1-3 cutaneous T-cell lymphoma after at least one prior systemic therapy.

The immunotherapy is a reformulation of denileukin diftitox (Ontak), initially approved in 1999 for certain patients with persistent or recurrent cutaneous T-cell lymphoma. In 2014, the original formulation was voluntarily withdrawn from the US market. Citius acquired rights to market a reformulated product outside of Asia in 2021. 

This is the first indication for Lymphir, which targets interleukin-2 receptors on malignant T cells.

This approval marks “a significant milestone” for patients with cutaneous T-cell lymphoma, a rare cancer, company CEO Leonard Mazur said in a press release announcing the approval. “The introduction of Lymphir, with its potential to rapidly reduce skin disease and control symptomatic itching without cumulative toxicity, is expected to expand the [cutaneous T-cell lymphoma] treatment landscape and grow the overall market, currently estimated to be $300-$400 million.” 

Approval was based on the single-arm, open-label 302 study in 69 patients who had a median of four prior anticancer therapies. Patients received 9 mcg/kg daily from day 1 to day 5 of 21-day cycles until disease progression or unacceptable toxicity.

The objective response rate was 36.2%, including complete responses in 8.7% of patients. Responses lasted 6 months or longer in 52% of patients. Over 80% of subjects had a decrease in skin tumor burden, and almost a third had clinically significant improvements in pruritus. 

Adverse events occurring in 20% or more of patients include increased transaminases, decreased albumin, decreased hemoglobin, nausea, edema, fatigue, musculoskeletal pain, rash, chills, constipation, pyrexia, and capillary leak syndrome.

Labeling carries a boxed warning of capillary leak syndrome. Other warnings include visual impairment, infusion reactions, hepatotoxicity, and embryo-fetal toxicity. Citius is under a postmarketing requirement to characterize the risk for visual impairment.

The company expects to launch the agent within 5 months.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

Chemotherapy has fallen out of favor for treating cancer toward the end of life. The toxicity is too high, and the benefit, if any, is often too low.

Immunotherapy, however, has been taking its place. Checkpoint inhibitors are increasingly being initiated to treat metastatic cancer in patients approaching the end of life and have become the leading driver of end-of-life cancer spending.

This means “there are patients who are getting immunotherapy who shouldn’t,” said Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, surgical oncologist Sajid Khan, MD, senior investigator on a recent study that highlighted the growing use of these agents in patients’ last month of life.

What’s driving this trend, and how can oncologists avoid overtreatment with immunotherapy at the end of life?
 

The N-of-1 Patient

With immunotherapy at the end of life, “each of us has had our N-of-1” where a patient bounces back with a remarkable and durable response, said Don Dizon, MD, a gynecologic oncologist at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island.

He recalled a patient with sarcoma who did not respond to chemotherapy. But after Dr. Dizon started her on immunotherapy, everything turned around. She has now been in remission for 8 years and counting.

The possibility of an unexpected or remarkable responder is seductive. And the improved safety of immunotherapy over chemotherapy adds to the allure.

Meanwhile, patients are often desperate. It’s rare for someone to be ready to stop treatment, Dr. Dizon said. Everybody “hopes that they’re going to be the exceptional responder.”

At the end of the day, the question often becomes: “Why not try immunotherapy? What’s there to lose?”

This thinking may be prompting broader use of immunotherapy in late-stage disease, even in instances with no Food and Drug Administration indication and virtually no supportive data, such as for metastatic ovarian cancer, Dr. Dizon said.
 

Back to Earth

The problem with the hopeful approach is that end-of-life turnarounds with immunotherapy are rare, and there’s no way at the moment to predict who will have one, said Laura Petrillo, MD, a palliative care physician at Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston.

Even though immunotherapy generally comes with fewer adverse events than chemotherapy, catastrophic side effects are still possible.

Dr. Petrillo recalled a 95-year-old woman with metastatic cancer who was largely asymptomatic.

She had a qualifying mutation for a checkpoint inhibitor, so her oncologist started her on one. The patient never bounced back from the severe colitis the agent caused, and she died of complications in the hospital.

Although such reactions with immunotherapy are uncommon, less serious problems caused by the agents can still have a major impact on a person’s quality of life. Low-grade diarrhea, for instance, may not sound too bad, but in a patient’s daily life, it can translate to six or more episodes a day.

Even with no side effects, prescribing immunotherapy can mean that patients with limited time left spend a good portion of it at an infusion clinic instead of at home. These patients are also less likely to be referred to hospice and more likely to be admitted to and die in the hospital.

And with treatments that can cost $20,000 per dose, financial toxicity becomes a big concern.

In short, some of the reasons why chemotherapy is not recommended at the end of life also apply to immunotherapy, Dr. Petrillo said.
 

Prescribing Decisions

Recent research highlights the growing use of immunotherapy at the end of life.

Dr. Khan’s retrospective study found, for instance, that the percentage of patients starting immunotherapy in the last 30 days of life increased by about fourfold to fivefold over the study period for the three cancers analyzed — stage IV melanoma, lung, and kidney cancers.

Among the population that died within 30 days, the percentage receiving immunotherapy increased over the study periods — 0.8%-4.3% for melanoma, 0.9%-3.2% for NSCLC, and 0.5%-2.6% for kidney cell carcinoma — prompting the conclusion that immunotherapy prescriptions in the last month of life are on the rise.

Prescribing immunotherapy in patients who ultimately died within 1 month occurred more frequently at low-volume, nonacademic centers than at academic or high-volume centers, and outcomes varied by practice setting.

Patients had better survival outcomes overall when receiving immunotherapy at academic or high-volume centers — a finding Dr. Khan said is worth investigating further. Possible explanations include better management of severe immune-related side effects at larger centers and more caution when prescribing immunotherapy to “borderline” candidates, such as those with several comorbidities.

Importantly, given the retrospective design, Dr. Khan and colleagues already knew which patients prescribed immunotherapy died within 30 days of initiating treatment.

More specifically, 5192 of 71,204 patients who received immunotherapy (7.3%) died within a month of initiating therapy, while 66,012 (92.7%) lived beyond that point.

The study, however, did not assess how the remaining 92.7% who lived beyond 30 days fared on immunotherapy and the differences between those who lived less than 30 days and those who survived longer.

Knowing the outcome of patients at the outset of the analysis still leaves open the question of when immunotherapy can extend life and when it can’t for the patient in front of you.

To avoid overtreating at the end of life, it’s important to have “the same standard that you have for giving chemotherapy. You have to treat it with the same respect,” said Moshe Chasky, MD, a community medical oncologist with Alliance Cancer Specialists in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. “You can’t just be throwing” immunotherapy around “at the end of life.”

While there are no clear predictors of risk and benefit, there are some factors to help guide decisions.

As with chemotherapy, Dr. Petrillo said performance status is key. Dr. Petrillo and colleagues found that median overall survival with immune checkpoint inhibitors for advanced non–small cell lung cancer was 14.3 months in patients with an Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group performance score of 0-1 but only 4.5 months with scores of ≥ 2.

Dr. Khan also found that immunotherapy survival is, unsurprisingly, worse in patients with high metastatic burdens and more comorbidities.

“You should still consider immunotherapy for metastatic melanoma, non–small cell lung cancer, and renal cell carcinoma,” Dr. Khan said. The message here is to “think twice before using” it, especially in comorbid patients with widespread metastases.

“Just because something can be done doesn’t always mean it should be done,” he said.

At Yale, when Dr. Khan works, immunotherapy decisions are considered by a multidisciplinary tumor board. At Mass General, immunotherapy has generally moved to the frontline setting, and the hospital no longer prescribes checkpoint inhibitors to hospitalized patients because the cost is too high relative to the potential benefit, Dr. Petrillo explained.

Still, with all the uncertainties about risk and benefit, counseling patients is a challenge. Dr. Dizon called it “the epitome of shared decision-making.”

Dr. Petrillo noted that it’s critical not to counsel patients based solely on the anecdotal patients who do surprisingly well.

“It’s hard to mention that and not have that be what somebody anchors on,” she said. But that speaks to “how desperate people can feel, how hopeful they can be.”

Dr. Khan, Dr. Petrillo, and Dr. Chasky all reported no relevant conflicts of interest.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

Chemotherapy has fallen out of favor for treating cancer toward the end of life. The toxicity is too high, and the benefit, if any, is often too low.

Immunotherapy, however, has been taking its place. Checkpoint inhibitors are increasingly being initiated to treat metastatic cancer in patients approaching the end of life and have become the leading driver of end-of-life cancer spending.

This means “there are patients who are getting immunotherapy who shouldn’t,” said Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, surgical oncologist Sajid Khan, MD, senior investigator on a recent study that highlighted the growing use of these agents in patients’ last month of life.

What’s driving this trend, and how can oncologists avoid overtreatment with immunotherapy at the end of life?
 

The N-of-1 Patient

With immunotherapy at the end of life, “each of us has had our N-of-1” where a patient bounces back with a remarkable and durable response, said Don Dizon, MD, a gynecologic oncologist at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island.

He recalled a patient with sarcoma who did not respond to chemotherapy. But after Dr. Dizon started her on immunotherapy, everything turned around. She has now been in remission for 8 years and counting.

The possibility of an unexpected or remarkable responder is seductive. And the improved safety of immunotherapy over chemotherapy adds to the allure.

Meanwhile, patients are often desperate. It’s rare for someone to be ready to stop treatment, Dr. Dizon said. Everybody “hopes that they’re going to be the exceptional responder.”

At the end of the day, the question often becomes: “Why not try immunotherapy? What’s there to lose?”

This thinking may be prompting broader use of immunotherapy in late-stage disease, even in instances with no Food and Drug Administration indication and virtually no supportive data, such as for metastatic ovarian cancer, Dr. Dizon said.
 

Back to Earth

The problem with the hopeful approach is that end-of-life turnarounds with immunotherapy are rare, and there’s no way at the moment to predict who will have one, said Laura Petrillo, MD, a palliative care physician at Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston.

Even though immunotherapy generally comes with fewer adverse events than chemotherapy, catastrophic side effects are still possible.

Dr. Petrillo recalled a 95-year-old woman with metastatic cancer who was largely asymptomatic.

She had a qualifying mutation for a checkpoint inhibitor, so her oncologist started her on one. The patient never bounced back from the severe colitis the agent caused, and she died of complications in the hospital.

Although such reactions with immunotherapy are uncommon, less serious problems caused by the agents can still have a major impact on a person’s quality of life. Low-grade diarrhea, for instance, may not sound too bad, but in a patient’s daily life, it can translate to six or more episodes a day.

Even with no side effects, prescribing immunotherapy can mean that patients with limited time left spend a good portion of it at an infusion clinic instead of at home. These patients are also less likely to be referred to hospice and more likely to be admitted to and die in the hospital.

And with treatments that can cost $20,000 per dose, financial toxicity becomes a big concern.

In short, some of the reasons why chemotherapy is not recommended at the end of life also apply to immunotherapy, Dr. Petrillo said.
 

Prescribing Decisions

Recent research highlights the growing use of immunotherapy at the end of life.

Dr. Khan’s retrospective study found, for instance, that the percentage of patients starting immunotherapy in the last 30 days of life increased by about fourfold to fivefold over the study period for the three cancers analyzed — stage IV melanoma, lung, and kidney cancers.

Among the population that died within 30 days, the percentage receiving immunotherapy increased over the study periods — 0.8%-4.3% for melanoma, 0.9%-3.2% for NSCLC, and 0.5%-2.6% for kidney cell carcinoma — prompting the conclusion that immunotherapy prescriptions in the last month of life are on the rise.

Prescribing immunotherapy in patients who ultimately died within 1 month occurred more frequently at low-volume, nonacademic centers than at academic or high-volume centers, and outcomes varied by practice setting.

Patients had better survival outcomes overall when receiving immunotherapy at academic or high-volume centers — a finding Dr. Khan said is worth investigating further. Possible explanations include better management of severe immune-related side effects at larger centers and more caution when prescribing immunotherapy to “borderline” candidates, such as those with several comorbidities.

Importantly, given the retrospective design, Dr. Khan and colleagues already knew which patients prescribed immunotherapy died within 30 days of initiating treatment.

More specifically, 5192 of 71,204 patients who received immunotherapy (7.3%) died within a month of initiating therapy, while 66,012 (92.7%) lived beyond that point.

The study, however, did not assess how the remaining 92.7% who lived beyond 30 days fared on immunotherapy and the differences between those who lived less than 30 days and those who survived longer.

Knowing the outcome of patients at the outset of the analysis still leaves open the question of when immunotherapy can extend life and when it can’t for the patient in front of you.

To avoid overtreating at the end of life, it’s important to have “the same standard that you have for giving chemotherapy. You have to treat it with the same respect,” said Moshe Chasky, MD, a community medical oncologist with Alliance Cancer Specialists in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. “You can’t just be throwing” immunotherapy around “at the end of life.”

While there are no clear predictors of risk and benefit, there are some factors to help guide decisions.

As with chemotherapy, Dr. Petrillo said performance status is key. Dr. Petrillo and colleagues found that median overall survival with immune checkpoint inhibitors for advanced non–small cell lung cancer was 14.3 months in patients with an Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group performance score of 0-1 but only 4.5 months with scores of ≥ 2.

Dr. Khan also found that immunotherapy survival is, unsurprisingly, worse in patients with high metastatic burdens and more comorbidities.

“You should still consider immunotherapy for metastatic melanoma, non–small cell lung cancer, and renal cell carcinoma,” Dr. Khan said. The message here is to “think twice before using” it, especially in comorbid patients with widespread metastases.

“Just because something can be done doesn’t always mean it should be done,” he said.

At Yale, when Dr. Khan works, immunotherapy decisions are considered by a multidisciplinary tumor board. At Mass General, immunotherapy has generally moved to the frontline setting, and the hospital no longer prescribes checkpoint inhibitors to hospitalized patients because the cost is too high relative to the potential benefit, Dr. Petrillo explained.

Still, with all the uncertainties about risk and benefit, counseling patients is a challenge. Dr. Dizon called it “the epitome of shared decision-making.”

Dr. Petrillo noted that it’s critical not to counsel patients based solely on the anecdotal patients who do surprisingly well.

“It’s hard to mention that and not have that be what somebody anchors on,” she said. But that speaks to “how desperate people can feel, how hopeful they can be.”

Dr. Khan, Dr. Petrillo, and Dr. Chasky all reported no relevant conflicts of interest.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

Chemotherapy has fallen out of favor for treating cancer toward the end of life. The toxicity is too high, and the benefit, if any, is often too low.

Immunotherapy, however, has been taking its place. Checkpoint inhibitors are increasingly being initiated to treat metastatic cancer in patients approaching the end of life and have become the leading driver of end-of-life cancer spending.

This means “there are patients who are getting immunotherapy who shouldn’t,” said Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, surgical oncologist Sajid Khan, MD, senior investigator on a recent study that highlighted the growing use of these agents in patients’ last month of life.

What’s driving this trend, and how can oncologists avoid overtreatment with immunotherapy at the end of life?
 

The N-of-1 Patient

With immunotherapy at the end of life, “each of us has had our N-of-1” where a patient bounces back with a remarkable and durable response, said Don Dizon, MD, a gynecologic oncologist at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island.

He recalled a patient with sarcoma who did not respond to chemotherapy. But after Dr. Dizon started her on immunotherapy, everything turned around. She has now been in remission for 8 years and counting.

The possibility of an unexpected or remarkable responder is seductive. And the improved safety of immunotherapy over chemotherapy adds to the allure.

Meanwhile, patients are often desperate. It’s rare for someone to be ready to stop treatment, Dr. Dizon said. Everybody “hopes that they’re going to be the exceptional responder.”

At the end of the day, the question often becomes: “Why not try immunotherapy? What’s there to lose?”

This thinking may be prompting broader use of immunotherapy in late-stage disease, even in instances with no Food and Drug Administration indication and virtually no supportive data, such as for metastatic ovarian cancer, Dr. Dizon said.
 

Back to Earth

The problem with the hopeful approach is that end-of-life turnarounds with immunotherapy are rare, and there’s no way at the moment to predict who will have one, said Laura Petrillo, MD, a palliative care physician at Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston.

Even though immunotherapy generally comes with fewer adverse events than chemotherapy, catastrophic side effects are still possible.

Dr. Petrillo recalled a 95-year-old woman with metastatic cancer who was largely asymptomatic.

She had a qualifying mutation for a checkpoint inhibitor, so her oncologist started her on one. The patient never bounced back from the severe colitis the agent caused, and she died of complications in the hospital.

Although such reactions with immunotherapy are uncommon, less serious problems caused by the agents can still have a major impact on a person’s quality of life. Low-grade diarrhea, for instance, may not sound too bad, but in a patient’s daily life, it can translate to six or more episodes a day.

Even with no side effects, prescribing immunotherapy can mean that patients with limited time left spend a good portion of it at an infusion clinic instead of at home. These patients are also less likely to be referred to hospice and more likely to be admitted to and die in the hospital.

And with treatments that can cost $20,000 per dose, financial toxicity becomes a big concern.

In short, some of the reasons why chemotherapy is not recommended at the end of life also apply to immunotherapy, Dr. Petrillo said.
 

Prescribing Decisions

Recent research highlights the growing use of immunotherapy at the end of life.

Dr. Khan’s retrospective study found, for instance, that the percentage of patients starting immunotherapy in the last 30 days of life increased by about fourfold to fivefold over the study period for the three cancers analyzed — stage IV melanoma, lung, and kidney cancers.

Among the population that died within 30 days, the percentage receiving immunotherapy increased over the study periods — 0.8%-4.3% for melanoma, 0.9%-3.2% for NSCLC, and 0.5%-2.6% for kidney cell carcinoma — prompting the conclusion that immunotherapy prescriptions in the last month of life are on the rise.

Prescribing immunotherapy in patients who ultimately died within 1 month occurred more frequently at low-volume, nonacademic centers than at academic or high-volume centers, and outcomes varied by practice setting.

Patients had better survival outcomes overall when receiving immunotherapy at academic or high-volume centers — a finding Dr. Khan said is worth investigating further. Possible explanations include better management of severe immune-related side effects at larger centers and more caution when prescribing immunotherapy to “borderline” candidates, such as those with several comorbidities.

Importantly, given the retrospective design, Dr. Khan and colleagues already knew which patients prescribed immunotherapy died within 30 days of initiating treatment.

More specifically, 5192 of 71,204 patients who received immunotherapy (7.3%) died within a month of initiating therapy, while 66,012 (92.7%) lived beyond that point.

The study, however, did not assess how the remaining 92.7% who lived beyond 30 days fared on immunotherapy and the differences between those who lived less than 30 days and those who survived longer.

Knowing the outcome of patients at the outset of the analysis still leaves open the question of when immunotherapy can extend life and when it can’t for the patient in front of you.

To avoid overtreating at the end of life, it’s important to have “the same standard that you have for giving chemotherapy. You have to treat it with the same respect,” said Moshe Chasky, MD, a community medical oncologist with Alliance Cancer Specialists in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. “You can’t just be throwing” immunotherapy around “at the end of life.”

While there are no clear predictors of risk and benefit, there are some factors to help guide decisions.

As with chemotherapy, Dr. Petrillo said performance status is key. Dr. Petrillo and colleagues found that median overall survival with immune checkpoint inhibitors for advanced non–small cell lung cancer was 14.3 months in patients with an Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group performance score of 0-1 but only 4.5 months with scores of ≥ 2.

Dr. Khan also found that immunotherapy survival is, unsurprisingly, worse in patients with high metastatic burdens and more comorbidities.

“You should still consider immunotherapy for metastatic melanoma, non–small cell lung cancer, and renal cell carcinoma,” Dr. Khan said. The message here is to “think twice before using” it, especially in comorbid patients with widespread metastases.

“Just because something can be done doesn’t always mean it should be done,” he said.

At Yale, when Dr. Khan works, immunotherapy decisions are considered by a multidisciplinary tumor board. At Mass General, immunotherapy has generally moved to the frontline setting, and the hospital no longer prescribes checkpoint inhibitors to hospitalized patients because the cost is too high relative to the potential benefit, Dr. Petrillo explained.

Still, with all the uncertainties about risk and benefit, counseling patients is a challenge. Dr. Dizon called it “the epitome of shared decision-making.”

Dr. Petrillo noted that it’s critical not to counsel patients based solely on the anecdotal patients who do surprisingly well.

“It’s hard to mention that and not have that be what somebody anchors on,” she said. But that speaks to “how desperate people can feel, how hopeful they can be.”

Dr. Khan, Dr. Petrillo, and Dr. Chasky all reported no relevant conflicts of interest.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

An easy-to-use web-based prognostic tool, MetroPancreas, may help predict the likelihood of futile pancreatectomy in patients with resectable pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma and improve patient selection for upfront surgery.

METHODOLOGY:

• Immediate resection is associated with a high incidence of postoperative complications and disease recurrence within a year of surgery in patients with pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma. Predicting which patients likely won’t benefit from upfront pancreatectomy is important.
• To identify preoperative risk factors for futile pancreatectomy, researchers evaluated 1426 patients (median age, 69 years; 53.2% men) with anatomically resectable pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma who underwent pancreatic resection between January 2010 and December 2021.
• The patients were divided into derivation (n = 885) and validation (n = 541) cohorts.
• The primary outcome was the rate of futile upfront pancreatectomy, defined as death or disease recurrence within 6 months of surgery. Patients were divided into three risk categories — low, intermediate, and high risk — each with escalating likelihoods of futile resection, worse pathological features, and worse outcomes.
• The secondary endpoint was to develop criteria for surgical candidacy, setting a futility likelihood threshold of < 20%. This threshold corresponds to the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval (CI) for postneoadjuvant resection rates (resection rate, 0.90; 95% CI, 0.80-1.01) from recent meta-analyses.

TAKEAWAY:

• The futility rate for pancreatectomy was 18.9% — 19.2% in the development cohort and 18.6% in the validation cohort. Three independent risk factors for futile resection included American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) class (95% CI for coefficients, 0.68-0.87), preoperative cancer antigen 19.9 serum levels (95% CI for coefficients, 0.05-0.75), and radiologic tumor size (95% CI for coefficients, 0.28-0.46).
• Using these independent risk factors, the predictive model demonstrated adequate calibration and discrimination in both the derivation and validation cohorts.
• The researchers then identified three risk groups. In the derivation cohort, the rate of futile pancreatectomy was 9.2% in the low-risk group, 18.0% in the intermediate-risk group, and 28.7% in the high-risk group (P < .001 for trend). In the validation cohort, the futility rate was 10.9% in the low-risk group, 20.2% in the intermediate-risk group, and 29.2% in the high-risk group (P < .001 for trend).
• Researchers identified four conditions associated with a futility likelihood below 20%, where larger tumor size is paired with lower cancer antigen 19.9 levels (defined as cancer antigen 19.9–adjusted-to-size). Patients who met these criteria experienced significantly longer disease-free survival (median 18.4 months vs 11.2 months) and overall survival (38.5 months vs 22.1 months).

IN PRACTICE:

“Although the study provides an easy-to-use calculator for clinical decision-making, there are some methodological limitations,” according to the authors of accompanying commentary. These limitations include failing to accurately describe how ASA class, cancer antigen 19.9 level, and tumor size were chosen for the model. “While we do not think the model is yet ready for standard clinical use, it may prove to be a viable tool if tested in future randomized trials comparing the neoadjuvant approach to upfront surgery in resectable pancreatic cancer,” the editorialists added.

SOURCE:

This study, led by Stefano Crippa, MD, PhD, Division of Pancreatic Surgery, Pancreas Translational and Clinical Research Center, San Raffaele Scientific Institute, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, Italy, and the accompanying commentary were published online in JAMA Surgery.

LIMITATIONS:

In addition to the limitations noted by the editorialists, others include the study’s retrospective design, which could introduce bias. Because preoperative imaging was not revised, the assigned resectability classes could show variability. Institutional differences existed in the selection process for upfront pancreatectomy. The model cannot be applied to cancer antigen 19.9 nonsecretors and was not externally validated.

DISCLOSURES:

The Italian Association for Cancer Research Special Program in Metastatic Disease and Italian Ministry of Health/Italian Foundation for the Research of Pancreatic Diseases supported the study in the form of a grant. Two authors reported receiving personal fees outside the submitted work. No other disclosures were reported.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

An easy-to-use web-based prognostic tool, MetroPancreas, may help predict the likelihood of futile pancreatectomy in patients with resectable pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma and improve patient selection for upfront surgery.

METHODOLOGY:

• Immediate resection is associated with a high incidence of postoperative complications and disease recurrence within a year of surgery in patients with pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma. Predicting which patients likely won’t benefit from upfront pancreatectomy is important.
• To identify preoperative risk factors for futile pancreatectomy, researchers evaluated 1426 patients (median age, 69 years; 53.2% men) with anatomically resectable pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma who underwent pancreatic resection between January 2010 and December 2021.
• The patients were divided into derivation (n = 885) and validation (n = 541) cohorts.
• The primary outcome was the rate of futile upfront pancreatectomy, defined as death or disease recurrence within 6 months of surgery. Patients were divided into three risk categories — low, intermediate, and high risk — each with escalating likelihoods of futile resection, worse pathological features, and worse outcomes.
• The secondary endpoint was to develop criteria for surgical candidacy, setting a futility likelihood threshold of < 20%. This threshold corresponds to the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval (CI) for postneoadjuvant resection rates (resection rate, 0.90; 95% CI, 0.80-1.01) from recent meta-analyses.

TAKEAWAY:

• The futility rate for pancreatectomy was 18.9% — 19.2% in the development cohort and 18.6% in the validation cohort. Three independent risk factors for futile resection included American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) class (95% CI for coefficients, 0.68-0.87), preoperative cancer antigen 19.9 serum levels (95% CI for coefficients, 0.05-0.75), and radiologic tumor size (95% CI for coefficients, 0.28-0.46).
• Using these independent risk factors, the predictive model demonstrated adequate calibration and discrimination in both the derivation and validation cohorts.
• The researchers then identified three risk groups. In the derivation cohort, the rate of futile pancreatectomy was 9.2% in the low-risk group, 18.0% in the intermediate-risk group, and 28.7% in the high-risk group (P < .001 for trend). In the validation cohort, the futility rate was 10.9% in the low-risk group, 20.2% in the intermediate-risk group, and 29.2% in the high-risk group (P < .001 for trend).
• Researchers identified four conditions associated with a futility likelihood below 20%, where larger tumor size is paired with lower cancer antigen 19.9 levels (defined as cancer antigen 19.9–adjusted-to-size). Patients who met these criteria experienced significantly longer disease-free survival (median 18.4 months vs 11.2 months) and overall survival (38.5 months vs 22.1 months).

IN PRACTICE:

“Although the study provides an easy-to-use calculator for clinical decision-making, there are some methodological limitations,” according to the authors of accompanying commentary. These limitations include failing to accurately describe how ASA class, cancer antigen 19.9 level, and tumor size were chosen for the model. “While we do not think the model is yet ready for standard clinical use, it may prove to be a viable tool if tested in future randomized trials comparing the neoadjuvant approach to upfront surgery in resectable pancreatic cancer,” the editorialists added.

SOURCE:

This study, led by Stefano Crippa, MD, PhD, Division of Pancreatic Surgery, Pancreas Translational and Clinical Research Center, San Raffaele Scientific Institute, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, Italy, and the accompanying commentary were published online in JAMA Surgery.

LIMITATIONS:

In addition to the limitations noted by the editorialists, others include the study’s retrospective design, which could introduce bias. Because preoperative imaging was not revised, the assigned resectability classes could show variability. Institutional differences existed in the selection process for upfront pancreatectomy. The model cannot be applied to cancer antigen 19.9 nonsecretors and was not externally validated.

DISCLOSURES:

The Italian Association for Cancer Research Special Program in Metastatic Disease and Italian Ministry of Health/Italian Foundation for the Research of Pancreatic Diseases supported the study in the form of a grant. Two authors reported receiving personal fees outside the submitted work. No other disclosures were reported.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

An easy-to-use web-based prognostic tool, MetroPancreas, may help predict the likelihood of futile pancreatectomy in patients with resectable pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma and improve patient selection for upfront surgery.

METHODOLOGY:

• Immediate resection is associated with a high incidence of postoperative complications and disease recurrence within a year of surgery in patients with pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma. Predicting which patients likely won’t benefit from upfront pancreatectomy is important.
• To identify preoperative risk factors for futile pancreatectomy, researchers evaluated 1426 patients (median age, 69 years; 53.2% men) with anatomically resectable pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma who underwent pancreatic resection between January 2010 and December 2021.
• The patients were divided into derivation (n = 885) and validation (n = 541) cohorts.
• The primary outcome was the rate of futile upfront pancreatectomy, defined as death or disease recurrence within 6 months of surgery. Patients were divided into three risk categories — low, intermediate, and high risk — each with escalating likelihoods of futile resection, worse pathological features, and worse outcomes.
• The secondary endpoint was to develop criteria for surgical candidacy, setting a futility likelihood threshold of < 20%. This threshold corresponds to the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval (CI) for postneoadjuvant resection rates (resection rate, 0.90; 95% CI, 0.80-1.01) from recent meta-analyses.

TAKEAWAY:

• The futility rate for pancreatectomy was 18.9% — 19.2% in the development cohort and 18.6% in the validation cohort. Three independent risk factors for futile resection included American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) class (95% CI for coefficients, 0.68-0.87), preoperative cancer antigen 19.9 serum levels (95% CI for coefficients, 0.05-0.75), and radiologic tumor size (95% CI for coefficients, 0.28-0.46).
• Using these independent risk factors, the predictive model demonstrated adequate calibration and discrimination in both the derivation and validation cohorts.
• The researchers then identified three risk groups. In the derivation cohort, the rate of futile pancreatectomy was 9.2% in the low-risk group, 18.0% in the intermediate-risk group, and 28.7% in the high-risk group (P < .001 for trend). In the validation cohort, the futility rate was 10.9% in the low-risk group, 20.2% in the intermediate-risk group, and 29.2% in the high-risk group (P < .001 for trend).
• Researchers identified four conditions associated with a futility likelihood below 20%, where larger tumor size is paired with lower cancer antigen 19.9 levels (defined as cancer antigen 19.9–adjusted-to-size). Patients who met these criteria experienced significantly longer disease-free survival (median 18.4 months vs 11.2 months) and overall survival (38.5 months vs 22.1 months).

IN PRACTICE:

“Although the study provides an easy-to-use calculator for clinical decision-making, there are some methodological limitations,” according to the authors of accompanying commentary. These limitations include failing to accurately describe how ASA class, cancer antigen 19.9 level, and tumor size were chosen for the model. “While we do not think the model is yet ready for standard clinical use, it may prove to be a viable tool if tested in future randomized trials comparing the neoadjuvant approach to upfront surgery in resectable pancreatic cancer,” the editorialists added.

SOURCE:

This study, led by Stefano Crippa, MD, PhD, Division of Pancreatic Surgery, Pancreas Translational and Clinical Research Center, San Raffaele Scientific Institute, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, Italy, and the accompanying commentary were published online in JAMA Surgery.

LIMITATIONS:

In addition to the limitations noted by the editorialists, others include the study’s retrospective design, which could introduce bias. Because preoperative imaging was not revised, the assigned resectability classes could show variability. Institutional differences existed in the selection process for upfront pancreatectomy. The model cannot be applied to cancer antigen 19.9 nonsecretors and was not externally validated.

DISCLOSURES:

The Italian Association for Cancer Research Special Program in Metastatic Disease and Italian Ministry of Health/Italian Foundation for the Research of Pancreatic Diseases supported the study in the form of a grant. Two authors reported receiving personal fees outside the submitted work. No other disclosures were reported.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

Strapped for cash and searching for new profits, Tennessee-based Erlanger Health System illegally paid excessive salaries to physicians in exchange for patient referrals, the US government alleged in a federal lawsuit.

Erlanger changed its compensation model to entice revenue-generating doctors, paying some two to three times the median salary for their specialty, according to the complaint. 

The physicians in turn referred numerous patients to Erlanger, and the health system submitted claims to Medicare for the referred services in violation of the Stark Law, according to the suit, filed in US District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. 

The government’s complaint “serves as a warning” to healthcare providers who try to boost profits through improper financial arrangements with referring physicians, said Tamala E. Miles, Special Agent in Charge for the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG).

In a statement provided to this news organization, Erlanger denied the allegations and said it would “vigorously” defend the lawsuit. 

“Erlanger paid physicians based on amounts that outside experts advised was fair market value,” Erlanger officials said in the statement. “Erlanger did not pay for referrals. A complete picture of the facts will demonstrate that the allegations lack merit and tell a very different story than what the government now claims.”

The Erlanger case is a reminder to physicians to consult their own knowledgeable advisors when considering financial arrangements with hospitals, said William Sarraille, JD, adjunct professor for the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law in Baltimore and a regulatory consultant. 

“There is a tendency by physicians when contracting ... to rely on [hospitals’] perceived compliance and legal expertise,” Mr. Sarraille told this news organization. “This case illustrates the risks in doing so. Sometimes bigger doesn’t translate into more sophisticated or more effective from a compliance perspective.” 
 

Stark Law Prohibits Kickbacks

The Stark Law prohibits hospitals from billing the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) for services referred by a physician with whom the hospital has an improper financial relationship.

CMS paid Erlanger about $27.8 million for claims stemming from the improper financial arrangements, the government contends. 

“HHS-OIG will continue to investigate such deals to prevent financial arrangements that could compromise impartial medical judgment, increase healthcare costs, and erode public trust in the healthcare system,” Ms. Miles said in a statement. 
 

Suit: Health System’s Money Woes Led to Illegal Arrangements

Erlanger’s financial troubles allegedly started after a previous run-in with the US government over false claims. 

In 2005, Erlanger Health System agreed to pay the government $40 million to resolve allegations that it knowingly submitted false claims to Medicare, according to the government’s complaint. At the time, Erlanger entered into a Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) with the OIG that required Erlanger to put controls in place to ensure its financial relationships did not violate the Stark Law. 

Erlanger’s agreement with OIG ended in 2010. Over the next 3 years, the health system lost nearly $32 million and in fiscal year 2013, had only 65 days of cash on hand, according to the government’s lawsuit. 

Beginning in 2013, Erlanger allegedly implemented a strategy to increase profits by employing more physicians, particularly specialists from competing hospitals whose patients would need costly hospital stays, according to the complaint. 

Once hired, Erlanger’s physicians were expected to treat patients at Erlanger’s hospitals and refer them to other providers within the health system, the suit claims. Erlanger also relaxed or eliminated the oversight and controls on physician compensation put in place under the CIA. For example, Erlanger’s CEO signed some compensation contracts before its chief compliance officer could review them and no longer allowed the compliance officer to vote on whether to approve compensation arrangements, according to the complaint. 

Erlanger also changed its compensation model to include large salaries for medical director and academic positions and allegedly paid such salaries to physicians without ensuring the required work was performed. As a result, Erlanger physicians with profitable referrals were among the highest paid in the nation for their specialties, the government claims. For example, according to the complaint:

• Erlanger paid an electrophysiologist an annual clinical salary of $816,701, a medical director salary of $101,080, an academic salary of $59,322, and a productivity incentive based on work relative value units (wRVUs). The medical director and academic salaries paid were near the 90th percentile of comparable salaries in the specialty.
• The health system paid a neurosurgeon a base salary of $654,735, a productivity incentive based on wRVUs, and payments for excess call coverage ranging from $400 to $1000 per 24-hour shift. In 2016, the neurosurgeon made $500,000 in excess call payments.
• Erlanger paid a cardiothoracic surgeon a base clinical salary of $1,070,000, a sign-on bonus of $150,000, a retention bonus of $100,000 (payable in the 4th year of the contract), and a program incentive of up to $150,000 per year.

In addition, Erlanger ignored patient safety concerns about some of its high revenue-generating physicians, the government claims. 

For instance, Erlanger received multiple complaints that a cardiothoracic surgeon was misusing an expensive form of life support in which pumps and oxygenators take over heart and lung function. Overuse of the equipment prolonged patients’ hospital stays and increased the hospital fees generated by the surgeon, according to the complaint. Staff also raised concerns about the cardiothoracic surgeon’s patient outcomes. 

But Erlanger disregarded the concerns and in 2018, increased the cardiothoracic surgeon’s retention bonus from $100,000 to $250,000, the suit alleges. A year later, the health system increased his base salary from $1,070,000 to $1,195,000.

Health care compensation and billing consultants alerted Erlanger that it was overpaying salaries and handing out bonuses based on measures that overstated the work physicians were performing, but Erlanger ignored the warnings, according to the complaint. 

Administrators allegedly resisted efforts by the chief compliance officer to hire an outside consultant to review its compensation models. Erlanger fired the compliance officer in 2019. 

The former chief compliance officer and another administrator filed a whistleblower lawsuit against Erlanger in 2021. The two administrators are relators in the government’s July 2024 lawsuit. 
 

How to Protect Yourself From Illegal Hospital Deals

The Erlanger case is the latest in a series of recent complaints by the federal government involving financial arrangements between hospitals and physicians.

In December 2023, Indianapolis-based Community Health Network Inc. agreed to pay the government $345 million to resolve claims that it paid physicians above fair market value and awarded bonuses tied to referrals in violation of the Stark Law. 

Also in 2023, Saginaw, Michigan–based Covenant HealthCare and two physicians paid the government $69 million to settle allegations that administrators engaged in improper financial arrangements with referring physicians and a physician-owned investment group. In another 2023 case, Massachusetts Eye and Ear in Boston agreed to pay $5.7 million to resolve claims that some of its physician compensation plans violated the Stark Law. 

Before you enter into a financial arrangement with a hospital, it’s also important to examine what percentile the aggregate compensation would reflect, law professor Mr. Sarraille said. The Erlanger case highlights federal officials’ suspicion of compensation, in aggregate, that exceeds the 90th percentile and increased attention to compensation that exceeds the 75th percentile, he said. 

To research compensation levels, doctors can review the Medical Group Management Association’s annual compensation report or search its compensation data. 

Before signing any contracts, Mr. Sarraille suggests, physicians should also consider whether the hospital shares the same values. Ask physicians at the hospital what they have to say about the hospital’s culture, vision, and values. Have physicians left the hospital after their practices were acquired? Consider speaking with them to learn why. 

Keep in mind that a doctor’s reputation could be impacted by a compliance complaint, regardless of whether it’s directed at the hospital and not the employed physician, Mr. Sarraille said. 

“The [Erlanger] complaint focuses on the compensation of specific, named physicians saying they were wildly overcompensated,” he said. “The implication is that they sold their referral power in exchange for a pay day. It’s a bad look, no matter how the case evolves from here.” 

Physicians could also face their own liability risk under the Stark Law and False Claims Act, depending on the circumstances. In the event of related quality-of-care issues, medical liability could come into play, Mr. Sarraille noted. In such cases, plaintiffs’ attorneys may see an opportunity to boost their claims with allegations that the patient harm was a function of “chasing compensation dollars,” Mr. Sarraille said. 

“Where that happens, plaintiff lawyers see the potential for crippling punitive damages, which might not be covered by an insurer,” he said.

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

Strapped for cash and searching for new profits, Tennessee-based Erlanger Health System illegally paid excessive salaries to physicians in exchange for patient referrals, the US government alleged in a federal lawsuit.

Erlanger changed its compensation model to entice revenue-generating doctors, paying some two to three times the median salary for their specialty, according to the complaint. 

The physicians in turn referred numerous patients to Erlanger, and the health system submitted claims to Medicare for the referred services in violation of the Stark Law, according to the suit, filed in US District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. 

The government’s complaint “serves as a warning” to healthcare providers who try to boost profits through improper financial arrangements with referring physicians, said Tamala E. Miles, Special Agent in Charge for the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG).

In a statement provided to this news organization, Erlanger denied the allegations and said it would “vigorously” defend the lawsuit. 

“Erlanger paid physicians based on amounts that outside experts advised was fair market value,” Erlanger officials said in the statement. “Erlanger did not pay for referrals. A complete picture of the facts will demonstrate that the allegations lack merit and tell a very different story than what the government now claims.”

The Erlanger case is a reminder to physicians to consult their own knowledgeable advisors when considering financial arrangements with hospitals, said William Sarraille, JD, adjunct professor for the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law in Baltimore and a regulatory consultant. 

“There is a tendency by physicians when contracting ... to rely on [hospitals’] perceived compliance and legal expertise,” Mr. Sarraille told this news organization. “This case illustrates the risks in doing so. Sometimes bigger doesn’t translate into more sophisticated or more effective from a compliance perspective.” 
 

Stark Law Prohibits Kickbacks

The Stark Law prohibits hospitals from billing the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) for services referred by a physician with whom the hospital has an improper financial relationship.

CMS paid Erlanger about $27.8 million for claims stemming from the improper financial arrangements, the government contends. 

“HHS-OIG will continue to investigate such deals to prevent financial arrangements that could compromise impartial medical judgment, increase healthcare costs, and erode public trust in the healthcare system,” Ms. Miles said in a statement. 
 

Suit: Health System’s Money Woes Led to Illegal Arrangements

Erlanger’s financial troubles allegedly started after a previous run-in with the US government over false claims. 

In 2005, Erlanger Health System agreed to pay the government $40 million to resolve allegations that it knowingly submitted false claims to Medicare, according to the government’s complaint. At the time, Erlanger entered into a Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) with the OIG that required Erlanger to put controls in place to ensure its financial relationships did not violate the Stark Law. 

Erlanger’s agreement with OIG ended in 2010. Over the next 3 years, the health system lost nearly $32 million and in fiscal year 2013, had only 65 days of cash on hand, according to the government’s lawsuit. 

Beginning in 2013, Erlanger allegedly implemented a strategy to increase profits by employing more physicians, particularly specialists from competing hospitals whose patients would need costly hospital stays, according to the complaint. 

Once hired, Erlanger’s physicians were expected to treat patients at Erlanger’s hospitals and refer them to other providers within the health system, the suit claims. Erlanger also relaxed or eliminated the oversight and controls on physician compensation put in place under the CIA. For example, Erlanger’s CEO signed some compensation contracts before its chief compliance officer could review them and no longer allowed the compliance officer to vote on whether to approve compensation arrangements, according to the complaint. 

Erlanger also changed its compensation model to include large salaries for medical director and academic positions and allegedly paid such salaries to physicians without ensuring the required work was performed. As a result, Erlanger physicians with profitable referrals were among the highest paid in the nation for their specialties, the government claims. For example, according to the complaint:

• Erlanger paid an electrophysiologist an annual clinical salary of $816,701, a medical director salary of $101,080, an academic salary of $59,322, and a productivity incentive based on work relative value units (wRVUs). The medical director and academic salaries paid were near the 90th percentile of comparable salaries in the specialty.
• The health system paid a neurosurgeon a base salary of $654,735, a productivity incentive based on wRVUs, and payments for excess call coverage ranging from $400 to $1000 per 24-hour shift. In 2016, the neurosurgeon made $500,000 in excess call payments.
• Erlanger paid a cardiothoracic surgeon a base clinical salary of $1,070,000, a sign-on bonus of $150,000, a retention bonus of $100,000 (payable in the 4th year of the contract), and a program incentive of up to $150,000 per year.

In addition, Erlanger ignored patient safety concerns about some of its high revenue-generating physicians, the government claims. 

For instance, Erlanger received multiple complaints that a cardiothoracic surgeon was misusing an expensive form of life support in which pumps and oxygenators take over heart and lung function. Overuse of the equipment prolonged patients’ hospital stays and increased the hospital fees generated by the surgeon, according to the complaint. Staff also raised concerns about the cardiothoracic surgeon’s patient outcomes. 

But Erlanger disregarded the concerns and in 2018, increased the cardiothoracic surgeon’s retention bonus from $100,000 to $250,000, the suit alleges. A year later, the health system increased his base salary from $1,070,000 to $1,195,000.

Health care compensation and billing consultants alerted Erlanger that it was overpaying salaries and handing out bonuses based on measures that overstated the work physicians were performing, but Erlanger ignored the warnings, according to the complaint. 

Administrators allegedly resisted efforts by the chief compliance officer to hire an outside consultant to review its compensation models. Erlanger fired the compliance officer in 2019. 

The former chief compliance officer and another administrator filed a whistleblower lawsuit against Erlanger in 2021. The two administrators are relators in the government’s July 2024 lawsuit. 
 

How to Protect Yourself From Illegal Hospital Deals

The Erlanger case is the latest in a series of recent complaints by the federal government involving financial arrangements between hospitals and physicians.

In December 2023, Indianapolis-based Community Health Network Inc. agreed to pay the government $345 million to resolve claims that it paid physicians above fair market value and awarded bonuses tied to referrals in violation of the Stark Law. 

Also in 2023, Saginaw, Michigan–based Covenant HealthCare and two physicians paid the government $69 million to settle allegations that administrators engaged in improper financial arrangements with referring physicians and a physician-owned investment group. In another 2023 case, Massachusetts Eye and Ear in Boston agreed to pay $5.7 million to resolve claims that some of its physician compensation plans violated the Stark Law. 

Before you enter into a financial arrangement with a hospital, it’s also important to examine what percentile the aggregate compensation would reflect, law professor Mr. Sarraille said. The Erlanger case highlights federal officials’ suspicion of compensation, in aggregate, that exceeds the 90th percentile and increased attention to compensation that exceeds the 75th percentile, he said. 

To research compensation levels, doctors can review the Medical Group Management Association’s annual compensation report or search its compensation data. 

Before signing any contracts, Mr. Sarraille suggests, physicians should also consider whether the hospital shares the same values. Ask physicians at the hospital what they have to say about the hospital’s culture, vision, and values. Have physicians left the hospital after their practices were acquired? Consider speaking with them to learn why. 

Keep in mind that a doctor’s reputation could be impacted by a compliance complaint, regardless of whether it’s directed at the hospital and not the employed physician, Mr. Sarraille said. 

“The [Erlanger] complaint focuses on the compensation of specific, named physicians saying they were wildly overcompensated,” he said. “The implication is that they sold their referral power in exchange for a pay day. It’s a bad look, no matter how the case evolves from here.” 

Physicians could also face their own liability risk under the Stark Law and False Claims Act, depending on the circumstances. In the event of related quality-of-care issues, medical liability could come into play, Mr. Sarraille noted. In such cases, plaintiffs’ attorneys may see an opportunity to boost their claims with allegations that the patient harm was a function of “chasing compensation dollars,” Mr. Sarraille said. 

“Where that happens, plaintiff lawyers see the potential for crippling punitive damages, which might not be covered by an insurer,” he said.

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

Strapped for cash and searching for new profits, Tennessee-based Erlanger Health System illegally paid excessive salaries to physicians in exchange for patient referrals, the US government alleged in a federal lawsuit.

Erlanger changed its compensation model to entice revenue-generating doctors, paying some two to three times the median salary for their specialty, according to the complaint. 

The physicians in turn referred numerous patients to Erlanger, and the health system submitted claims to Medicare for the referred services in violation of the Stark Law, according to the suit, filed in US District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. 

The government’s complaint “serves as a warning” to healthcare providers who try to boost profits through improper financial arrangements with referring physicians, said Tamala E. Miles, Special Agent in Charge for the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG).

In a statement provided to this news organization, Erlanger denied the allegations and said it would “vigorously” defend the lawsuit. 

“Erlanger paid physicians based on amounts that outside experts advised was fair market value,” Erlanger officials said in the statement. “Erlanger did not pay for referrals. A complete picture of the facts will demonstrate that the allegations lack merit and tell a very different story than what the government now claims.”

The Erlanger case is a reminder to physicians to consult their own knowledgeable advisors when considering financial arrangements with hospitals, said William Sarraille, JD, adjunct professor for the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law in Baltimore and a regulatory consultant. 

“There is a tendency by physicians when contracting ... to rely on [hospitals’] perceived compliance and legal expertise,” Mr. Sarraille told this news organization. “This case illustrates the risks in doing so. Sometimes bigger doesn’t translate into more sophisticated or more effective from a compliance perspective.” 
 

Stark Law Prohibits Kickbacks

The Stark Law prohibits hospitals from billing the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) for services referred by a physician with whom the hospital has an improper financial relationship.

CMS paid Erlanger about $27.8 million for claims stemming from the improper financial arrangements, the government contends. 

“HHS-OIG will continue to investigate such deals to prevent financial arrangements that could compromise impartial medical judgment, increase healthcare costs, and erode public trust in the healthcare system,” Ms. Miles said in a statement. 
 

Suit: Health System’s Money Woes Led to Illegal Arrangements

Erlanger’s financial troubles allegedly started after a previous run-in with the US government over false claims. 

In 2005, Erlanger Health System agreed to pay the government $40 million to resolve allegations that it knowingly submitted false claims to Medicare, according to the government’s complaint. At the time, Erlanger entered into a Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) with the OIG that required Erlanger to put controls in place to ensure its financial relationships did not violate the Stark Law. 

Erlanger’s agreement with OIG ended in 2010. Over the next 3 years, the health system lost nearly $32 million and in fiscal year 2013, had only 65 days of cash on hand, according to the government’s lawsuit. 

Beginning in 2013, Erlanger allegedly implemented a strategy to increase profits by employing more physicians, particularly specialists from competing hospitals whose patients would need costly hospital stays, according to the complaint. 

Once hired, Erlanger’s physicians were expected to treat patients at Erlanger’s hospitals and refer them to other providers within the health system, the suit claims. Erlanger also relaxed or eliminated the oversight and controls on physician compensation put in place under the CIA. For example, Erlanger’s CEO signed some compensation contracts before its chief compliance officer could review them and no longer allowed the compliance officer to vote on whether to approve compensation arrangements, according to the complaint. 

Erlanger also changed its compensation model to include large salaries for medical director and academic positions and allegedly paid such salaries to physicians without ensuring the required work was performed. As a result, Erlanger physicians with profitable referrals were among the highest paid in the nation for their specialties, the government claims. For example, according to the complaint:

• Erlanger paid an electrophysiologist an annual clinical salary of $816,701, a medical director salary of $101,080, an academic salary of $59,322, and a productivity incentive based on work relative value units (wRVUs). The medical director and academic salaries paid were near the 90th percentile of comparable salaries in the specialty.
• The health system paid a neurosurgeon a base salary of $654,735, a productivity incentive based on wRVUs, and payments for excess call coverage ranging from $400 to $1000 per 24-hour shift. In 2016, the neurosurgeon made $500,000 in excess call payments.
• Erlanger paid a cardiothoracic surgeon a base clinical salary of $1,070,000, a sign-on bonus of $150,000, a retention bonus of $100,000 (payable in the 4th year of the contract), and a program incentive of up to $150,000 per year.

In addition, Erlanger ignored patient safety concerns about some of its high revenue-generating physicians, the government claims. 

For instance, Erlanger received multiple complaints that a cardiothoracic surgeon was misusing an expensive form of life support in which pumps and oxygenators take over heart and lung function. Overuse of the equipment prolonged patients’ hospital stays and increased the hospital fees generated by the surgeon, according to the complaint. Staff also raised concerns about the cardiothoracic surgeon’s patient outcomes. 

But Erlanger disregarded the concerns and in 2018, increased the cardiothoracic surgeon’s retention bonus from $100,000 to $250,000, the suit alleges. A year later, the health system increased his base salary from $1,070,000 to $1,195,000.

Health care compensation and billing consultants alerted Erlanger that it was overpaying salaries and handing out bonuses based on measures that overstated the work physicians were performing, but Erlanger ignored the warnings, according to the complaint. 

Administrators allegedly resisted efforts by the chief compliance officer to hire an outside consultant to review its compensation models. Erlanger fired the compliance officer in 2019. 

The former chief compliance officer and another administrator filed a whistleblower lawsuit against Erlanger in 2021. The two administrators are relators in the government’s July 2024 lawsuit. 
 

How to Protect Yourself From Illegal Hospital Deals

The Erlanger case is the latest in a series of recent complaints by the federal government involving financial arrangements between hospitals and physicians.

In December 2023, Indianapolis-based Community Health Network Inc. agreed to pay the government $345 million to resolve claims that it paid physicians above fair market value and awarded bonuses tied to referrals in violation of the Stark Law. 

Also in 2023, Saginaw, Michigan–based Covenant HealthCare and two physicians paid the government $69 million to settle allegations that administrators engaged in improper financial arrangements with referring physicians and a physician-owned investment group. In another 2023 case, Massachusetts Eye and Ear in Boston agreed to pay $5.7 million to resolve claims that some of its physician compensation plans violated the Stark Law. 

Before you enter into a financial arrangement with a hospital, it’s also important to examine what percentile the aggregate compensation would reflect, law professor Mr. Sarraille said. The Erlanger case highlights federal officials’ suspicion of compensation, in aggregate, that exceeds the 90th percentile and increased attention to compensation that exceeds the 75th percentile, he said. 

To research compensation levels, doctors can review the Medical Group Management Association’s annual compensation report or search its compensation data. 

Before signing any contracts, Mr. Sarraille suggests, physicians should also consider whether the hospital shares the same values. Ask physicians at the hospital what they have to say about the hospital’s culture, vision, and values. Have physicians left the hospital after their practices were acquired? Consider speaking with them to learn why. 

Keep in mind that a doctor’s reputation could be impacted by a compliance complaint, regardless of whether it’s directed at the hospital and not the employed physician, Mr. Sarraille said. 

“The [Erlanger] complaint focuses on the compensation of specific, named physicians saying they were wildly overcompensated,” he said. “The implication is that they sold their referral power in exchange for a pay day. It’s a bad look, no matter how the case evolves from here.” 

Physicians could also face their own liability risk under the Stark Law and False Claims Act, depending on the circumstances. In the event of related quality-of-care issues, medical liability could come into play, Mr. Sarraille noted. In such cases, plaintiffs’ attorneys may see an opportunity to boost their claims with allegations that the patient harm was a function of “chasing compensation dollars,” Mr. Sarraille said. 

“Where that happens, plaintiff lawyers see the potential for crippling punitive damages, which might not be covered by an insurer,” he said.

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

In a case that spotlights the importance of comprehensive financial controls in medical offices, a leading New York City emergency medicine physician stands accused of using his business credit card to steal nearly $1.5 million from his clinical practice and spend it on cash advances, personal travel, lavish pet services, and more.

Michael Lucchesi, MD, who had served as chairman of Emergency Medicine at SUNY Downstate Medical Center in New York City, was arraigned on July 9 and pleaded not guilty. Dr. Lucchesi’s attorney, Earl Ward, did not respond to messages from this news organization, but he told the New York Post that “the funds he used were not stolen funds.”

Dr. Lucchesi, who’s in his late 60s, faces nine counts of first- and second-degree grand larceny, first-degree falsifying business records, and third-degree criminal tax fraud. According to a press statement from the district attorney of Kings County, which encompasses the borough of Brooklyn, Dr. Lucchesi is accused of using his clinical practice’s business card for cash advances (about $115,000), high-end pet care ($176,000), personal travel ($348,000), gym membership and personal training ($109,000), catering ($52,000), tuition payments for his children ($46,000), and other expenses such as online shopping, flowers, liquor, and electronics.

Most of the alleged pet care spending — $120,000 — went to the Green Leaf Pet Resort, which has two locations in New Jersey, including one with “56 acres of nature and lots of tail wagging.” Some of the alleged spending on gym membership was at the New York Sports Clubs chain, where monthly membership tops out at $139.99.

The alleged spending occurred between 2016 and 2023 and was discovered by SUNY Downstate during an audit. Dr. Lucchesi reportedly left his position at the hospital, where he made $399,712 in 2022 as a professor, according to public records.

“As a high-ranking doctor at this vital healthcare institution, this defendant was entrusted with access to significant funds, which he allegedly exploited, stealing more than 1 million dollars to pay for a lavish lifestyle,” District Attorney Eric Gonzalez said in a statement.

SUNY Downstate is in a fight for its life amid efforts by New York Governor Kathy Hochul to shut it down. According to The New York Times, it is the only state-run hospital in New York City.

Dr. Lucchesi, who had previously served as the hospital’s chief medical officer and acting head, was released without bail. His next court date is September 25, 2024.
 

Size of Alleged Theft Is ‘Very Unusual’

David P. Weber, JD, DBA, a professor and fraud specialist at Salisbury University, Salisbury, Maryland, told this news organization that the fraudulent use of a business or purchase credit card is a form of embezzlement and “one of the most frequently seen types of frauds against organizations.”

William J. Kresse, JD, MSA, CPA/CFF, who studies fraud at Governors State University in University Park, Illinois, noted in an interview with this news organization that the high amount of alleged fraud in this case is “very unusual,” as is the period it is said to have occurred (over 6 years).

Mr. Kresse highlighted a 2024 report by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, which found that the median fraud loss in healthcare, on the basis of 117 cases, is $100,000. The most common form of fraud in the industry is corruption (47%), followed by billing (38%), noncash theft such as inventory (22%), and expense reimbursement (21%).

The details of the current case suggest that “SUNY Downstate had weak or insufficient internal controls to prevent this type of fraud,” Salisbury University’s Mr. Weber said. “However, research also makes clear that the tenure and position of the perpetrator play a significant role in the size of the fraud. Internal controls are supposed to apply to all employees, but the higher in the organization the perpetrator is, the easier it can be to engage in fraud.”
 

Even Small Medical Offices Can Act to Prevent Fraud

What can be done to prevent this kind of fraud? “Each employee should be required to submit actual receipts or scanned copies, and the reimbursement requests should be reviewed and inputted by a separate department or office of the organization to ensure that the expenses are legitimate,” Mr. Weber said. “In addition, all credit card statements should be available for review by the organization either simultaneously with the bill going to the employee or available for audit or review at any time without notification to the employee. Expenses that are in certain categories should be prohibited automatically and coded to the card so such a charge is rejected by the credit card bank.”

Smaller businesses — like many medical practices — may not have the manpower to handle these roles. In that case, Mr. Weber said, “The key is segregation or separation of duties. The bookkeeper cannot be the person receiving the bank statements, the payments from patients, and the invoices from vendors. There needs to be at least one other person in the loop to have some level of control.”

One strategy, he said, “is that the practice should institute a policy that only the doctor or owner of the practice can receive the mail, not the bookkeeper. Even if the practice leader does not actually review the bank statements, simply opening them before handing them off to the bookkeeper can provide a level of deterrence [since] the employee may get caught if someone else is reviewing the bank statements.”
 

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

In a case that spotlights the importance of comprehensive financial controls in medical offices, a leading New York City emergency medicine physician stands accused of using his business credit card to steal nearly $1.5 million from his clinical practice and spend it on cash advances, personal travel, lavish pet services, and more.

Michael Lucchesi, MD, who had served as chairman of Emergency Medicine at SUNY Downstate Medical Center in New York City, was arraigned on July 9 and pleaded not guilty. Dr. Lucchesi’s attorney, Earl Ward, did not respond to messages from this news organization, but he told the New York Post that “the funds he used were not stolen funds.”

Dr. Lucchesi, who’s in his late 60s, faces nine counts of first- and second-degree grand larceny, first-degree falsifying business records, and third-degree criminal tax fraud. According to a press statement from the district attorney of Kings County, which encompasses the borough of Brooklyn, Dr. Lucchesi is accused of using his clinical practice’s business card for cash advances (about $115,000), high-end pet care ($176,000), personal travel ($348,000), gym membership and personal training ($109,000), catering ($52,000), tuition payments for his children ($46,000), and other expenses such as online shopping, flowers, liquor, and electronics.

Most of the alleged pet care spending — $120,000 — went to the Green Leaf Pet Resort, which has two locations in New Jersey, including one with “56 acres of nature and lots of tail wagging.” Some of the alleged spending on gym membership was at the New York Sports Clubs chain, where monthly membership tops out at $139.99.

The alleged spending occurred between 2016 and 2023 and was discovered by SUNY Downstate during an audit. Dr. Lucchesi reportedly left his position at the hospital, where he made $399,712 in 2022 as a professor, according to public records.

“As a high-ranking doctor at this vital healthcare institution, this defendant was entrusted with access to significant funds, which he allegedly exploited, stealing more than 1 million dollars to pay for a lavish lifestyle,” District Attorney Eric Gonzalez said in a statement.

SUNY Downstate is in a fight for its life amid efforts by New York Governor Kathy Hochul to shut it down. According to The New York Times, it is the only state-run hospital in New York City.

Dr. Lucchesi, who had previously served as the hospital’s chief medical officer and acting head, was released without bail. His next court date is September 25, 2024.
 

Size of Alleged Theft Is ‘Very Unusual’

David P. Weber, JD, DBA, a professor and fraud specialist at Salisbury University, Salisbury, Maryland, told this news organization that the fraudulent use of a business or purchase credit card is a form of embezzlement and “one of the most frequently seen types of frauds against organizations.”

William J. Kresse, JD, MSA, CPA/CFF, who studies fraud at Governors State University in University Park, Illinois, noted in an interview with this news organization that the high amount of alleged fraud in this case is “very unusual,” as is the period it is said to have occurred (over 6 years).

Mr. Kresse highlighted a 2024 report by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, which found that the median fraud loss in healthcare, on the basis of 117 cases, is $100,000. The most common form of fraud in the industry is corruption (47%), followed by billing (38%), noncash theft such as inventory (22%), and expense reimbursement (21%).

The details of the current case suggest that “SUNY Downstate had weak or insufficient internal controls to prevent this type of fraud,” Salisbury University’s Mr. Weber said. “However, research also makes clear that the tenure and position of the perpetrator play a significant role in the size of the fraud. Internal controls are supposed to apply to all employees, but the higher in the organization the perpetrator is, the easier it can be to engage in fraud.”
 

Even Small Medical Offices Can Act to Prevent Fraud

What can be done to prevent this kind of fraud? “Each employee should be required to submit actual receipts or scanned copies, and the reimbursement requests should be reviewed and inputted by a separate department or office of the organization to ensure that the expenses are legitimate,” Mr. Weber said. “In addition, all credit card statements should be available for review by the organization either simultaneously with the bill going to the employee or available for audit or review at any time without notification to the employee. Expenses that are in certain categories should be prohibited automatically and coded to the card so such a charge is rejected by the credit card bank.”

Smaller businesses — like many medical practices — may not have the manpower to handle these roles. In that case, Mr. Weber said, “The key is segregation or separation of duties. The bookkeeper cannot be the person receiving the bank statements, the payments from patients, and the invoices from vendors. There needs to be at least one other person in the loop to have some level of control.”

One strategy, he said, “is that the practice should institute a policy that only the doctor or owner of the practice can receive the mail, not the bookkeeper. Even if the practice leader does not actually review the bank statements, simply opening them before handing them off to the bookkeeper can provide a level of deterrence [since] the employee may get caught if someone else is reviewing the bank statements.”
 

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

In a case that spotlights the importance of comprehensive financial controls in medical offices, a leading New York City emergency medicine physician stands accused of using his business credit card to steal nearly $1.5 million from his clinical practice and spend it on cash advances, personal travel, lavish pet services, and more.

Michael Lucchesi, MD, who had served as chairman of Emergency Medicine at SUNY Downstate Medical Center in New York City, was arraigned on July 9 and pleaded not guilty. Dr. Lucchesi’s attorney, Earl Ward, did not respond to messages from this news organization, but he told the New York Post that “the funds he used were not stolen funds.”

Dr. Lucchesi, who’s in his late 60s, faces nine counts of first- and second-degree grand larceny, first-degree falsifying business records, and third-degree criminal tax fraud. According to a press statement from the district attorney of Kings County, which encompasses the borough of Brooklyn, Dr. Lucchesi is accused of using his clinical practice’s business card for cash advances (about $115,000), high-end pet care ($176,000), personal travel ($348,000), gym membership and personal training ($109,000), catering ($52,000), tuition payments for his children ($46,000), and other expenses such as online shopping, flowers, liquor, and electronics.

Most of the alleged pet care spending — $120,000 — went to the Green Leaf Pet Resort, which has two locations in New Jersey, including one with “56 acres of nature and lots of tail wagging.” Some of the alleged spending on gym membership was at the New York Sports Clubs chain, where monthly membership tops out at $139.99.

The alleged spending occurred between 2016 and 2023 and was discovered by SUNY Downstate during an audit. Dr. Lucchesi reportedly left his position at the hospital, where he made $399,712 in 2022 as a professor, according to public records.

“As a high-ranking doctor at this vital healthcare institution, this defendant was entrusted with access to significant funds, which he allegedly exploited, stealing more than 1 million dollars to pay for a lavish lifestyle,” District Attorney Eric Gonzalez said in a statement.

SUNY Downstate is in a fight for its life amid efforts by New York Governor Kathy Hochul to shut it down. According to The New York Times, it is the only state-run hospital in New York City.

Dr. Lucchesi, who had previously served as the hospital’s chief medical officer and acting head, was released without bail. His next court date is September 25, 2024.
 

Size of Alleged Theft Is ‘Very Unusual’

David P. Weber, JD, DBA, a professor and fraud specialist at Salisbury University, Salisbury, Maryland, told this news organization that the fraudulent use of a business or purchase credit card is a form of embezzlement and “one of the most frequently seen types of frauds against organizations.”

William J. Kresse, JD, MSA, CPA/CFF, who studies fraud at Governors State University in University Park, Illinois, noted in an interview with this news organization that the high amount of alleged fraud in this case is “very unusual,” as is the period it is said to have occurred (over 6 years).

Mr. Kresse highlighted a 2024 report by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, which found that the median fraud loss in healthcare, on the basis of 117 cases, is $100,000. The most common form of fraud in the industry is corruption (47%), followed by billing (38%), noncash theft such as inventory (22%), and expense reimbursement (21%).

The details of the current case suggest that “SUNY Downstate had weak or insufficient internal controls to prevent this type of fraud,” Salisbury University’s Mr. Weber said. “However, research also makes clear that the tenure and position of the perpetrator play a significant role in the size of the fraud. Internal controls are supposed to apply to all employees, but the higher in the organization the perpetrator is, the easier it can be to engage in fraud.”
 

Even Small Medical Offices Can Act to Prevent Fraud

What can be done to prevent this kind of fraud? “Each employee should be required to submit actual receipts or scanned copies, and the reimbursement requests should be reviewed and inputted by a separate department or office of the organization to ensure that the expenses are legitimate,” Mr. Weber said. “In addition, all credit card statements should be available for review by the organization either simultaneously with the bill going to the employee or available for audit or review at any time without notification to the employee. Expenses that are in certain categories should be prohibited automatically and coded to the card so such a charge is rejected by the credit card bank.”

Smaller businesses — like many medical practices — may not have the manpower to handle these roles. In that case, Mr. Weber said, “The key is segregation or separation of duties. The bookkeeper cannot be the person receiving the bank statements, the payments from patients, and the invoices from vendors. There needs to be at least one other person in the loop to have some level of control.”

One strategy, he said, “is that the practice should institute a policy that only the doctor or owner of the practice can receive the mail, not the bookkeeper. Even if the practice leader does not actually review the bank statements, simply opening them before handing them off to the bookkeeper can provide a level of deterrence [since] the employee may get caught if someone else is reviewing the bank statements.”
 

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved afamitresgene autoleucel (afami-cel) (Tecelra, Adaptimmune LLC) to treat advanced synovial sarcoma. 

Afami-cel — the first engineered cell therapy for a solid tumor — is indicated specifically for adults with unresectable or metastatic synovial sarcoma who have received prior chemotherapy, are positive for several human leukocyte antigens (HLAs), and whose tumors express melanoma-associated antigen A4, as determined by FDA-authorized companion diagnostic devices.

The single-dose treatment targets solid tumors expressing melanoma-associated antigen A4, a protein highly expressed in synovial sarcoma.

Synovial sarcoma is a rare form of cancer, which affects about 1000 people in the US each year. Malignant cells develop and form a tumor in soft tissues, often in the extremities. 

“Adults with metastatic synovial sarcoma, a life-threatening form of cancer, often face limited treatment options in addition to the risk of cancer spread or recurrence,” Nicole Verdun, MD, director of the Office of Therapeutic Products in the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, said in the agency press release announcing the approval. “Today’s approval represents a significant milestone in the development of an innovative, safe and effective therapy for patients with this rare but potentially fatal disease.”

T-cell receptor therapy, like chimeric antigen receptor (CAR) T-cell (CAR-T) therapy, involves altering patient T cells to fight cancer. While CAR-T therapy inserts an artificial receptor to target a specific surface protein on cancer cells, the T-cell receptor therapy modifies existing receptors to recognize an array of antigens on the surface of cancer cells — a promising strategy for targeting solid tumors. 

The accelerated approval of afami-cel was based on the phase 2 SPEARHEAD-1 trial in 44 patients with synovial sarcoma who received a single infusion of the therapy. The trial had enrolled 52 patients, but 8 did not receive afami-cel, including 3 who died and 1 who withdrew. 

According to the FDA announcement, the overall response rate was 43.2%, with a median time to response of 4.9 weeks. The median duration of response was 6 months (95% CI, 4.6 months to not reached). Among patients who responded, 39% had a duration of response of 12 months or longer.

“These results suggest that a one-time treatment with afami-cel has the potential to extend life while allowing responders to go off chemotherapy,” said lead investigator Sandra D’Angelo, MD, a sarcoma specialist at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center in New York City, in a company press release.

The prescribing information includes a boxed warning for serious or fatal cytokine release syndrome.

The most common nonlaboratory adverse reactions, occurring in at least 20% of patients, included cytokine release syndrome, nausea, vomiting, fatigue, infections, pyrexia, constipation, dyspnea, tachycardia, hypotension, diarrhea, and edema. The most common grade 3 or 4 laboratory abnormalities, occurring in at least 20% of patients, included decreased lymphocyte count, neutrophil count, white cell blood count, red blood cell, and platelet count.

The recommended dose is between 2.68x109 to 10x109 MAGE-A4 T-cell receptor–positive T-cells. The FDA notice specifies not using a leukodepleting filter or prophylactic systemic corticosteroids.

The list price for the one-time therapy is $727,000, according to Fierce Pharma.
 

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved afamitresgene autoleucel (afami-cel) (Tecelra, Adaptimmune LLC) to treat advanced synovial sarcoma. 

Afami-cel — the first engineered cell therapy for a solid tumor — is indicated specifically for adults with unresectable or metastatic synovial sarcoma who have received prior chemotherapy, are positive for several human leukocyte antigens (HLAs), and whose tumors express melanoma-associated antigen A4, as determined by FDA-authorized companion diagnostic devices.

The single-dose treatment targets solid tumors expressing melanoma-associated antigen A4, a protein highly expressed in synovial sarcoma.

Synovial sarcoma is a rare form of cancer, which affects about 1000 people in the US each year. Malignant cells develop and form a tumor in soft tissues, often in the extremities. 

“Adults with metastatic synovial sarcoma, a life-threatening form of cancer, often face limited treatment options in addition to the risk of cancer spread or recurrence,” Nicole Verdun, MD, director of the Office of Therapeutic Products in the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, said in the agency press release announcing the approval. “Today’s approval represents a significant milestone in the development of an innovative, safe and effective therapy for patients with this rare but potentially fatal disease.”

T-cell receptor therapy, like chimeric antigen receptor (CAR) T-cell (CAR-T) therapy, involves altering patient T cells to fight cancer. While CAR-T therapy inserts an artificial receptor to target a specific surface protein on cancer cells, the T-cell receptor therapy modifies existing receptors to recognize an array of antigens on the surface of cancer cells — a promising strategy for targeting solid tumors. 

The accelerated approval of afami-cel was based on the phase 2 SPEARHEAD-1 trial in 44 patients with synovial sarcoma who received a single infusion of the therapy. The trial had enrolled 52 patients, but 8 did not receive afami-cel, including 3 who died and 1 who withdrew. 

According to the FDA announcement, the overall response rate was 43.2%, with a median time to response of 4.9 weeks. The median duration of response was 6 months (95% CI, 4.6 months to not reached). Among patients who responded, 39% had a duration of response of 12 months or longer.

“These results suggest that a one-time treatment with afami-cel has the potential to extend life while allowing responders to go off chemotherapy,” said lead investigator Sandra D’Angelo, MD, a sarcoma specialist at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center in New York City, in a company press release.

The prescribing information includes a boxed warning for serious or fatal cytokine release syndrome.

The most common nonlaboratory adverse reactions, occurring in at least 20% of patients, included cytokine release syndrome, nausea, vomiting, fatigue, infections, pyrexia, constipation, dyspnea, tachycardia, hypotension, diarrhea, and edema. The most common grade 3 or 4 laboratory abnormalities, occurring in at least 20% of patients, included decreased lymphocyte count, neutrophil count, white cell blood count, red blood cell, and platelet count.

The recommended dose is between 2.68x109 to 10x109 MAGE-A4 T-cell receptor–positive T-cells. The FDA notice specifies not using a leukodepleting filter or prophylactic systemic corticosteroids.

The list price for the one-time therapy is $727,000, according to Fierce Pharma.
 

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved afamitresgene autoleucel (afami-cel) (Tecelra, Adaptimmune LLC) to treat advanced synovial sarcoma. 

Afami-cel — the first engineered cell therapy for a solid tumor — is indicated specifically for adults with unresectable or metastatic synovial sarcoma who have received prior chemotherapy, are positive for several human leukocyte antigens (HLAs), and whose tumors express melanoma-associated antigen A4, as determined by FDA-authorized companion diagnostic devices.

The single-dose treatment targets solid tumors expressing melanoma-associated antigen A4, a protein highly expressed in synovial sarcoma.

Synovial sarcoma is a rare form of cancer, which affects about 1000 people in the US each year. Malignant cells develop and form a tumor in soft tissues, often in the extremities. 

“Adults with metastatic synovial sarcoma, a life-threatening form of cancer, often face limited treatment options in addition to the risk of cancer spread or recurrence,” Nicole Verdun, MD, director of the Office of Therapeutic Products in the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, said in the agency press release announcing the approval. “Today’s approval represents a significant milestone in the development of an innovative, safe and effective therapy for patients with this rare but potentially fatal disease.”

T-cell receptor therapy, like chimeric antigen receptor (CAR) T-cell (CAR-T) therapy, involves altering patient T cells to fight cancer. While CAR-T therapy inserts an artificial receptor to target a specific surface protein on cancer cells, the T-cell receptor therapy modifies existing receptors to recognize an array of antigens on the surface of cancer cells — a promising strategy for targeting solid tumors. 

The accelerated approval of afami-cel was based on the phase 2 SPEARHEAD-1 trial in 44 patients with synovial sarcoma who received a single infusion of the therapy. The trial had enrolled 52 patients, but 8 did not receive afami-cel, including 3 who died and 1 who withdrew. 

According to the FDA announcement, the overall response rate was 43.2%, with a median time to response of 4.9 weeks. The median duration of response was 6 months (95% CI, 4.6 months to not reached). Among patients who responded, 39% had a duration of response of 12 months or longer.

“These results suggest that a one-time treatment with afami-cel has the potential to extend life while allowing responders to go off chemotherapy,” said lead investigator Sandra D’Angelo, MD, a sarcoma specialist at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center in New York City, in a company press release.

The prescribing information includes a boxed warning for serious or fatal cytokine release syndrome.

The most common nonlaboratory adverse reactions, occurring in at least 20% of patients, included cytokine release syndrome, nausea, vomiting, fatigue, infections, pyrexia, constipation, dyspnea, tachycardia, hypotension, diarrhea, and edema. The most common grade 3 or 4 laboratory abnormalities, occurring in at least 20% of patients, included decreased lymphocyte count, neutrophil count, white cell blood count, red blood cell, and platelet count.

The recommended dose is between 2.68x109 to 10x109 MAGE-A4 T-cell receptor–positive T-cells. The FDA notice specifies not using a leukodepleting filter or prophylactic systemic corticosteroids.

The list price for the one-time therapy is $727,000, according to Fierce Pharma.
 

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved daratumumab and hyaluronidase-fihj (Darzalex Faspro, Janssen Research and Development LLC) in combination with bortezomib, lenalidomide, and dexamethasone for induction and consolidation in transplant-eligible patients with newly diagnosed multiple myeloma.

Approval followed priority review and was based on efficacy and safety findings from the open-label PERSEUS trial involving 709 patients under age 70 years who were randomized to receive bortezomib, lenalidomide, and dexamethasone alone or in combination with daratumumab and hyaluronidase-fihj, according to the FDA. 

Compared with bortezomib, lenalidomide, and dexamethasone alone, the addition of daratumumab and hyaluronidase-fihj resulted in a 60% reduction in the risk for disease progression or death (hazard ratio, 0.40). Median progression-free survival was not reached in either group.

Adverse reactions occurring in ≥ 20% of patients were peripheral neuropathy, fatigue, edema, pyrexia, upper respiratory infection, constipation, diarrhea, musculoskeletal pain, insomnia, and rash. 

The recommended dosage for this indication is 1800 mg daratumumab and 30,000 units hyaluronidase, according to the full prescribing information.

Daratumumab and hyaluronidase-fihj, which was first approved in 2020, has a range of other indications in multiple myeloma.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved daratumumab and hyaluronidase-fihj (Darzalex Faspro, Janssen Research and Development LLC) in combination with bortezomib, lenalidomide, and dexamethasone for induction and consolidation in transplant-eligible patients with newly diagnosed multiple myeloma.

Approval followed priority review and was based on efficacy and safety findings from the open-label PERSEUS trial involving 709 patients under age 70 years who were randomized to receive bortezomib, lenalidomide, and dexamethasone alone or in combination with daratumumab and hyaluronidase-fihj, according to the FDA. 

Compared with bortezomib, lenalidomide, and dexamethasone alone, the addition of daratumumab and hyaluronidase-fihj resulted in a 60% reduction in the risk for disease progression or death (hazard ratio, 0.40). Median progression-free survival was not reached in either group.

Adverse reactions occurring in ≥ 20% of patients were peripheral neuropathy, fatigue, edema, pyrexia, upper respiratory infection, constipation, diarrhea, musculoskeletal pain, insomnia, and rash. 

The recommended dosage for this indication is 1800 mg daratumumab and 30,000 units hyaluronidase, according to the full prescribing information.

Daratumumab and hyaluronidase-fihj, which was first approved in 2020, has a range of other indications in multiple myeloma.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved daratumumab and hyaluronidase-fihj (Darzalex Faspro, Janssen Research and Development LLC) in combination with bortezomib, lenalidomide, and dexamethasone for induction and consolidation in transplant-eligible patients with newly diagnosed multiple myeloma.

Approval followed priority review and was based on efficacy and safety findings from the open-label PERSEUS trial involving 709 patients under age 70 years who were randomized to receive bortezomib, lenalidomide, and dexamethasone alone or in combination with daratumumab and hyaluronidase-fihj, according to the FDA. 

Compared with bortezomib, lenalidomide, and dexamethasone alone, the addition of daratumumab and hyaluronidase-fihj resulted in a 60% reduction in the risk for disease progression or death (hazard ratio, 0.40). Median progression-free survival was not reached in either group.

Adverse reactions occurring in ≥ 20% of patients were peripheral neuropathy, fatigue, edema, pyrexia, upper respiratory infection, constipation, diarrhea, musculoskeletal pain, insomnia, and rash. 

The recommended dosage for this indication is 1800 mg daratumumab and 30,000 units hyaluronidase, according to the full prescribing information.

Daratumumab and hyaluronidase-fihj, which was first approved in 2020, has a range of other indications in multiple myeloma.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

Oncologists show significant variability in prescribing systemic cancer therapies in the last 30 days of life. Patients treated by oncologists in the top quartile for end-of-life prescribing behavior were almost four and a half times more likely to receive end-of-life therapy than those treated by these specialists in the bottom quartile.

METHODOLOGY:

• Researchers analyzed data from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER)-Medicare database, focusing on patients who died of cancer between 2012 and 2017.
• A total of 17,609 patients with breast, lung, colorectal, or prostate cancer were included, treated by 960 oncologists across 388 practices.
• Patients were required to have had at least one systemic cancer therapy claim in the last 180 days of life, with the treating oncologist identified on the basis of the therapy claim closest to the time of death.
• The study used multilevel models to estimate oncologists’ rates of providing cancer therapy in the last 30 days of life, adjusting for patient characteristics and practice variation.
• Functional status was assessed on the basis of paid claims for durable medical equipment in the last 60 months of life, with scores categorized as 0, 1, ≥ 2, or unknown.

TAKEAWAY:

• Oncologists in the 95th percentile for high end-of-life prescribing behavior had a 45% adjusted rate of treating patients in the last 30 days of life, compared with 17% among those in the 5th percentile.
• Patients treated by high end-of-life prescribing oncologists had over four times higher odds of receiving systemic therapy in the last 30 days of life (odds ratio [OR], 4.42; 95% CI, 4.00-4.89).
• Higher end-of-life prescribing oncologists also had a higher proportion of patients hospitalized in the last 30 days of life than low prescribers (58% vs 51.9%).
• No significant association was found between oncologist prescribing behavior and patient race or ethnicity, except for Black patients who had lower odds of receiving treatment (OR, 0.77; P < .001).

IN PRACTICE:

“Given calls to rein in overutilization of end-of-life six to eight cancer therapies, our findings highlight an underappreciated area for further research: How treatment discontinuation before death is shaped by oncologists’ unique treatment propensities. Elucidating the reasons for this remarkable variability in oncologist treatment behavior could inform efforts to reduce end-of-life cancer treatment overutilization,” wrote the authors of the study.

SOURCE:

The study was led by Login S. George, PhD, Institute for Health, Health Care Policy and Aging Research, Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. It was published online in Cancer.

LIMITATIONS:

The study’s reliance on SEER-Medicare data may limit the generalizability of the findings to patients with Medicare Advantage, private insurance, or Medicaid, as well as younger patients. The lack of data on patient preferences and other health characteristics could confound the results. The study focused on systemic therapies and may not be generalizable to other treatments such as clinical trial drugs, oral therapies, surgery, or radiation. The data from 2012 to 2017 may not reflect more recent trends in cancer treatment.

DISCLOSURES:

The study was supported by grants from the National Cancer Institute and the Rutgers Cancer Institute of New Jersey. George disclosed receiving grants from these organizations. Additional disclosures are noted in the original article.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

Oncologists show significant variability in prescribing systemic cancer therapies in the last 30 days of life. Patients treated by oncologists in the top quartile for end-of-life prescribing behavior were almost four and a half times more likely to receive end-of-life therapy than those treated by these specialists in the bottom quartile.

METHODOLOGY:

• Researchers analyzed data from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER)-Medicare database, focusing on patients who died of cancer between 2012 and 2017.
• A total of 17,609 patients with breast, lung, colorectal, or prostate cancer were included, treated by 960 oncologists across 388 practices.
• Patients were required to have had at least one systemic cancer therapy claim in the last 180 days of life, with the treating oncologist identified on the basis of the therapy claim closest to the time of death.
• The study used multilevel models to estimate oncologists’ rates of providing cancer therapy in the last 30 days of life, adjusting for patient characteristics and practice variation.
• Functional status was assessed on the basis of paid claims for durable medical equipment in the last 60 months of life, with scores categorized as 0, 1, ≥ 2, or unknown.

TAKEAWAY:

• Oncologists in the 95th percentile for high end-of-life prescribing behavior had a 45% adjusted rate of treating patients in the last 30 days of life, compared with 17% among those in the 5th percentile.
• Patients treated by high end-of-life prescribing oncologists had over four times higher odds of receiving systemic therapy in the last 30 days of life (odds ratio [OR], 4.42; 95% CI, 4.00-4.89).
• Higher end-of-life prescribing oncologists also had a higher proportion of patients hospitalized in the last 30 days of life than low prescribers (58% vs 51.9%).
• No significant association was found between oncologist prescribing behavior and patient race or ethnicity, except for Black patients who had lower odds of receiving treatment (OR, 0.77; P < .001).

IN PRACTICE:

“Given calls to rein in overutilization of end-of-life six to eight cancer therapies, our findings highlight an underappreciated area for further research: How treatment discontinuation before death is shaped by oncologists’ unique treatment propensities. Elucidating the reasons for this remarkable variability in oncologist treatment behavior could inform efforts to reduce end-of-life cancer treatment overutilization,” wrote the authors of the study.

SOURCE:

The study was led by Login S. George, PhD, Institute for Health, Health Care Policy and Aging Research, Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. It was published online in Cancer.

LIMITATIONS:

The study’s reliance on SEER-Medicare data may limit the generalizability of the findings to patients with Medicare Advantage, private insurance, or Medicaid, as well as younger patients. The lack of data on patient preferences and other health characteristics could confound the results. The study focused on systemic therapies and may not be generalizable to other treatments such as clinical trial drugs, oral therapies, surgery, or radiation. The data from 2012 to 2017 may not reflect more recent trends in cancer treatment.

DISCLOSURES:

The study was supported by grants from the National Cancer Institute and the Rutgers Cancer Institute of New Jersey. George disclosed receiving grants from these organizations. Additional disclosures are noted in the original article.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

Oncologists show significant variability in prescribing systemic cancer therapies in the last 30 days of life. Patients treated by oncologists in the top quartile for end-of-life prescribing behavior were almost four and a half times more likely to receive end-of-life therapy than those treated by these specialists in the bottom quartile.

METHODOLOGY:

• Researchers analyzed data from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER)-Medicare database, focusing on patients who died of cancer between 2012 and 2017.
• A total of 17,609 patients with breast, lung, colorectal, or prostate cancer were included, treated by 960 oncologists across 388 practices.
• Patients were required to have had at least one systemic cancer therapy claim in the last 180 days of life, with the treating oncologist identified on the basis of the therapy claim closest to the time of death.
• The study used multilevel models to estimate oncologists’ rates of providing cancer therapy in the last 30 days of life, adjusting for patient characteristics and practice variation.
• Functional status was assessed on the basis of paid claims for durable medical equipment in the last 60 months of life, with scores categorized as 0, 1, ≥ 2, or unknown.

TAKEAWAY:

• Oncologists in the 95th percentile for high end-of-life prescribing behavior had a 45% adjusted rate of treating patients in the last 30 days of life, compared with 17% among those in the 5th percentile.
• Patients treated by high end-of-life prescribing oncologists had over four times higher odds of receiving systemic therapy in the last 30 days of life (odds ratio [OR], 4.42; 95% CI, 4.00-4.89).
• Higher end-of-life prescribing oncologists also had a higher proportion of patients hospitalized in the last 30 days of life than low prescribers (58% vs 51.9%).
• No significant association was found between oncologist prescribing behavior and patient race or ethnicity, except for Black patients who had lower odds of receiving treatment (OR, 0.77; P < .001).

IN PRACTICE:

“Given calls to rein in overutilization of end-of-life six to eight cancer therapies, our findings highlight an underappreciated area for further research: How treatment discontinuation before death is shaped by oncologists’ unique treatment propensities. Elucidating the reasons for this remarkable variability in oncologist treatment behavior could inform efforts to reduce end-of-life cancer treatment overutilization,” wrote the authors of the study.

SOURCE:

The study was led by Login S. George, PhD, Institute for Health, Health Care Policy and Aging Research, Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. It was published online in Cancer.

LIMITATIONS:

The study’s reliance on SEER-Medicare data may limit the generalizability of the findings to patients with Medicare Advantage, private insurance, or Medicaid, as well as younger patients. The lack of data on patient preferences and other health characteristics could confound the results. The study focused on systemic therapies and may not be generalizable to other treatments such as clinical trial drugs, oral therapies, surgery, or radiation. The data from 2012 to 2017 may not reflect more recent trends in cancer treatment.

DISCLOSURES:

The study was supported by grants from the National Cancer Institute and the Rutgers Cancer Institute of New Jersey. George disclosed receiving grants from these organizations. Additional disclosures are noted in the original article.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.